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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
RONALD D. ELLIS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES; and CHRISTINE 
BRUNER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
---0000000---
NATURE OF CASE 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 16881 
Plaintiff-appellant Ronald D. Ellis (hereinafter 
"Mr. Ellis") commenced this habeas corpus action in the 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County on January 3, 
1980, seeking to obtain custody of his infant son born 
December 15, 1979, to defendant-respondent Christine Bruner 
(hereinafter "Miss Bruner"), who relinquished the child to 
defendant-respondent LDS Social Services (hereinafter "LDS 
Social Services) immediately following its birth. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 21, 1980, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
dismissed plaintiff-appellant's action with prejudice upon 
the motion of LDS Social Services, thereby purportedly 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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forever precluding Mr. Ellis from gaining custody of his 
son. This motion was presumably based upon Rule 12(b) (1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the dismissal upon the 
District Court's belief that Mr. Ellis had not complied with 
the notice requirements of Section 78-30-4(3), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Ellis respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the District Court's dismissal of this action and 
remand the matter with instructions to determine Mr. Ellis's 
fitness to have custody of his son and to award custody to 
Mr. Ellis unless he is found unfit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The District Court received no evidence before 
dismissing plaintiff-appellant's verified Complaint; therefore, 
there is no evidentiary Record presently before this Court 
and the allegations of the verified Complaint must be 
considered true. 
Mr. Ellis and Miss Bruner are both bona fide 
residents and domiciliaries of California. Neither has 
lived within Utah at any time material to this action. 
Mr. Ellis is 23 years of age and gainfully employed as a 
department manager by a retail grocery store in San Marino, 
California. 
-2-
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Miss Bruner and Mr. Ellis were to be married on 
July 16, 1979; however, approximately two weeks before the 
marriage was to take place, Miss Bruner advised Mr. Ellis 
that, because of religious differences existing between 
them, she had decided to terminate their engagement. At 
this time, both parties were aware that Miss Bruner was 
pregnant. Miss Bruner has since consistently refused 
Mr. Ellis's proposals of marriage. 
Immediately prior to her delivery, Miss Bruner 
left California and came to Utah without the knowledge or 
consent of Mr. Ellis. On December 15, 1979, Miss Bruner 
gave birth to Mr. Ellis's son in the Utah Valley Hospital, 
Utah County, Utah. On December 19, 1979, the fourth day 
following her delivery, Miss Bruner executed a document 
entitled "Affidavit and Release" by which she purportedly 
relinquished her inf ant to LDS Social Services and abandoned 
all further interest in the child. 
Through a bishop of the L.D.S. Church in California, 
Mr. Ellis learned of Miss Bruner's whereabouts and the birth 
of his son. During the week of his son's birth, Mr. Ellis 
and his California attorney contacted LDS Social Serivces 
and informed them both of his paternity and of his desire to 
support and have custody of his son. LDS Social Services 
refused to relinquish custody of the infant to Mr. Ellis or 
-3-
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even to give him any information concerning the child's 
whereabouts and also failed to advise him of any steps which 
would have to be undertaken to protect his parental rights. 
On January 2, 1980, Mr. Ellis filed with the 
Bureau of Vital Statistics an acknowledgement of his pater-
nity of the child and a statement of his willingness and 
intent to support his son to the best of his ability. 
Thereafter, Mr. Ellis filed the present action 
just 12 working days after the birth of his son. The hearing 
on the Writ of Habeas Corpus was scheduled for January 22, 
1980; however, defendants-respondents noticed their motion 
to dismiss for hearing before the Law and Motion Division on 
January 21, 1980. Following this hearing, at which no 
evidence was received, the District Court dismissed this 
action with prejudice. It is from this ruling that Mr. 
Ellis appeals to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
It was the contention of defendants-respondents in 
their oral argument to the District Court that Mr. Ellis's 
action was barred by his failure to plead timely compliance 
with the provisions of Section 78-30-4(3), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). That section provides that any unwed 
-4-
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father who fails to file the required notice of paternity 
shall be forever barred from bringing any action to establish 
his paternity of, to gain custody of, or to adopt his child. 
The notice must be filed with the Bureau of Vital Statistics 
within the time period prescribed by subsection (b), which 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
The notice may be registered 
prior to the birth of the child 
but must be registered prior to 
the date the illegitimate child 
is relinquished or placed with an 
agency licensed to provide adoption 
services or prior to the filing of 
a petition by a person with whom 
the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. . 
§78-30-4(3) (b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). In 
their arguments to the District Court, defendants-respondents 
placed complete reliance upon the fact that Miss Bruner 
signed a document entitled "Affidavit and Release" on 
December 19, 1979, whereas Mr. Ellis did not file his notice 
of paternity until January 2, 1980. The issues raised by 
this appeal, therefore, include both the construction to be 
placed upon Section 78-30-4 ( 3) (Points II and III, infra) 
and the constitutional validity of the section (Point I, 
infra) . 
I. THE DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION DENIES MR. ELLIS 
THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW GUARANTEED 
-5-
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TO HIM BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
Section 7 of Article I of the Utah Constitution, 
in language identical with that of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, mandates that "no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Accordingly, if Mr. Ellis, although unwed, 
has an interest in his son which rises to the level of 
"liberty or property", then that interest may not be termin-
ated or infringed except through such means as satisfy the 
so-called "due process" and "equal protection" requirements 
of both the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which is made applicable to 
state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Interest of an Unwed Father in His Child 
is Constitutionally Protected. 
This Court has held that in determining the scope 
of the interests to be protected and degree of protection to 
be afforded by the Utah Constitution, the constitutional 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court are "highly 
persuasive". For example, in Untermyer v. State Tax Commission, 
102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942), this Court observed: 
The due process clause of the 
state constitution is substantially 
the same as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. 
-6-
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Decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on the due process 
clauses of the Federal Constitution 
are "highly persuasive" as to the 
application of that clause to our 
state constitution. 
129 P.2d at 885. Accordingly, in order to determine in the 
present case whether, although unwed, Mr. Ellis has an 
interest in his son which is to be afforded constitutional 
protection, it is appropriate to look to the opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L.Ed.2d 
551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
firmly held that an unwed father does have a constitutionally 
protected interest in his children. At issue in that case 
was a state law which, in effect, provided that children of 
unwed fathers became wards of the state upon the death of 
the natural mother. The Court first ruled that the interest 
of a father in his children was sufficiently important to be 
constitutionally protected, holding: 
The private interest here, that of 
a man in the children he has sired and 
raised, undeniably warrants deference 
and, absent a powerful countervailing 
interest, protection. It is plain that 
the interest of a parent in the compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children "come(s) to this 
court with a momentum for respect lack-
ing when appeal is made to ~ib7rties 
which derive merely from shifting 
-7-
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economic arrangements." 
The rights to conceive and raise one's 
children have been deemed "essential" 
. . . and "(r) ights far more 
precious ... than property rights" 
405 U.S. at 651, 31 L.Ed.2d at 558 (citations omitted, 
emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court also made 
clear that a man's interest in his children was no less 
constitutionally protected merely because he had not been 
formally married to their mother: 
[T]he law [has not] refused to 
recognize those family relationships 
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. 
The Court has declared unconstitutional 
the state statute denying natural, but 
illegitimate, children a wrongful-death 
action for the death of their mother, 
emphasizing that such children cannot 
be denied the right of other children 
because familial bonds in such cases 
were often as warm, enduring, and 
important as those arising within a 
more formally organized family unit. 
. . . "To say that the test of equal 
protection should be that of 'legal' 
rather than biological relationship 
is to avoid the issue. . " 
405 U.S. at 651-52, 31 L.Ed. 2d at 559 (citations omitted). 
The Court then unequivocally stated its holding that: 
Stanley's interest in retaining 
custody of his children is cogniz-
able and substantial. 
405 U.S. 652, 31 L.Ed.2d at 559. Thus, in addition to what-
ever statutory rights may be accorded to Mr. Ellis under 
-8-
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Utah law, he has a constitutionally protected interest in 
his son. 
The holding of the United States Supreme Court in 
Stanley that an unwed father has a constitutionally protected 
interest in his children remains firmly intact. In Quilloin 
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 98 S.Ct. 549 
(1978), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the 
case was distinguishable from Stanley since the natural 
father was seeking, some 11 years after the birth of the 
child, merely to assert a "veto" to an adoption by the 
child's step-father. The Court pointedly observed that, in 
Quilloin, the natural father did 
not challenge the sufficiency of 
the notice he received with respect 
to the adoption proceeding . . . 
nor [could] he claim that he was 
deprived of a right to a hearing on 
his individualized interests in his 
child, prior to entry of the order 
of adoption. Although the trial 
court's ultimate conclusion was that 
the appellant lacked standing to 
object to the adoption, this 
conclusion was reached only after 
appellant had been afforded a full 
hearing on his legitimation 
petition, at which he was g~ven 
the opportunity to offer evidence 
on any matter he thought relevant, 
including his fitness as a parent. 
at 253, 54 L.Ed.2d at 518-19 (footnote omitted). 434 U.S. 
Moreover, the court expressly stated its continued recog-
-9-
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nition of the constitutionally protected relationship 
between all parents and their children and again emphasized 
that Quilloin was 
not a case in which the unwed father 
at any time had, or sought, actual 
or legal custody of his child. 
434 U.S. at 255, 54 L.Ed.2d at 520. 
The continued applicablity of Stanley has been 
consistently emphasized in many subsequent state court 
decisions, including In re Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P.2d 894 
(Ct. App. Kan. 1978). In that case, the court held: 
It is clear that Quilloin does 
not abrogate the basic premise of 
the Stanley case: that is, that a 
putative father does in fact have 
parental rights in his child. The 
holding of the Quilloin case is 
actually quite narrow: the consti-
tutional rights of an unwed father 
who merely seeks to veto the adoption 
of his child, without seeking custody 
of the child, are adequately protected 
by something less than a fitness hear-
ing, and under the facts of that case 
his rights were protected by a "best 
interest of the child" hearing. 
575 P.2d at 898. See also, Willmott v. Decker, 541 P.2d 13 
(Hawaii 1975); People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's 
Home, 52 Ill.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); State ex rel. 
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis.2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 
826 (1973). 
-10-
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Accordingly, the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in Stanley that an unwed father has a constit-
utionally protected interest in his child continues to be 
recognized as the final pronouncement of the United States 
Supreme Court on this subject. 
B. Section 78-30-4 Unconstitutionally Denies 
Mr. Ellis Due Process of Law. 
Having determined that Mr. Ellis does in fact have 
a constitutionally protected interest in his son, it is next 
necessary to determine the minimum degree of protection 
which must be afforded to that interest. In Riggins v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 
(1935) , this Court concisely summarized the essential safe-
guards to be afforded constitutionally protected interests: 
Due process of law requires that 
notice be given to the persons 
whose rights are to be affected. 
It "hears before it condemns, 
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial." 
51 P.2d at 660. Notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard are, therefore, the essential eleme~ts of due process. 
A more detailed statement of this concept was set 
forth in Christiansen v. Ha~ris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 
(1945). It was notice accompanied by a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard that were again held to be the primary requirement: 
-11-
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Many attempts have been made to 
further define "due process-" but 
they all resolve into the thought 
that a party shall have his day 
in court--that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing 
before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and intro-
ducing evidence to establish his 
cause or his defense, after which 
comes judgment upon the record thus 
made .... [All of the] methods and 
means provided for the protection 
and enforcement of human rights have 
the same basic requirements--that no 
party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the 
subject of an inquiry by a person or 
body authorized by law to determine 
such rights, of which inquiry the 
party has due notice, and at which 
he had an opportunity to be heard 
and to give evidence as to his rights 
or defenses. 
163 P.2d at 316-17. 
The constitutional requirement of a meaningful 
hearing upon notice has frequently been reaffirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court. For example, in United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 37 L.Ed.2d 
767, 93 S. Ct. 2832 (1973), the Court held constitutionally 
invalid a provision of the food stamp program that denied 
participation to any household having a member 18 years of 
age or older if that person was claimed as a dependant by 
any taxpayer. The basis of the decision was that the 
statutory provision created a presumption (which was not 
-12-
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universally true) that such households were not in need of 
the assistance afforded by the food stamp program. The 
Court rejected the contention that such a presumption was 
justified since it rendered the administration of the over-
all program more efficient: 
[W]here the private interests affected 
are very important and the governmental 
interest can be promoted without much 
difficulty by a well-designed hearing 
procedure, the Due Process Clause 
requires the Government to act on an 
individualized basis, with general 
propositions serving only as rebuttable 
presumptions or other burden-shifting 
devices. 
413 U.S. at 518, 37 L.Ed.2d at 775 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) . 
In this case, defendants-respondents place total 
reliance upon the claimed failure of Mr. Ellis to file his 
notice of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics 
within the time period prescribed by Section 78-30-4(3) (b), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Assuming, arguendo, 
that Mr. Ellis did not timely file the notice required by 
this section (Contra, Points II and III, infra) and that 
such a requirement is valid (Contra, Point I(C), infra), 
subsection (c) then operates to presume, from such failure, 
an abandonment of the child: 
Any father of [an illegitimate] 
child who fails to file and register 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his notice of claim to paternity and 
his agreement to support the child 
shall be barred from thereafter bring-
ing or maintaining any action to 
establish his paternity of the child. 
Such failure shall further constitute 
an abandonment of said child and a 
waiver and surrender of any right 
to notice of or to a hearing in any 
judicial proceeding for the adoption 
of said child, and the consent of 
such father to the adoption of such 
child shall not be required. 
§78-30-4(3) (c), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Thus 
the statute, as defendants-respondents contend it should be 
applied to Mr. Ellis, presumes his abandonment of his son 
from the mere fact that he is an unwed father and did not 
file his notice of paternity prior to the relinquishment of 
the child by its mother to LDS Social Services. 
This presumption of an abandonment of the child is 
directly analogous to the presumption held to be constitut-
ionally impermissible in Stanley. In that case, as noted 
above, the Illinois statute at issue provided that, upon the 
death of the natural mother, illegitimate children were 
deemed wards of the state, thereby creating a presumption 
that all unwed fathers were unfit as parents. The United 
States Supreme Court noted that the state 
insists on presuming rather than 
proving Stanley's unfitness solely 
because it is more convenient to 
presume than to prove. Under the 
-14-
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Due Process Clause that advantage 
is insufficient to justify refusing 
a father a hearing when the issue 
at stake is the dismemberment of 
his family. 
The State of Illinois assumes 
custody of the children of married 
parents, divorced parents, and 
unmarried mothers only after a 
hearing and proof of neglect. The 
children of unmarried fathers, 
however, are declared dependent 
children without a hearing on 
parental fitness and without proof 
of neglect. 
405 U.S. at 658, 31 L.Ed.2d at 562. The court also consid-
ered, and summarily rejected, the state's contention that 
since most unwed fathers probably were unfit, the economy 
and efficiency achieved through the statute justified any 
infringement upon the interests of unwed fathers in their 
children: 
Procedure by presumption is 
always cheaper and easier than 
individualized determination. But 
when, as here, the procedure fore-
closes the determinative issues of 
competence and care, when it 
explicitly disdains present realities 
in deference to past formalities, it 
needlessly risks running roughshod 
over the important interests of both 
parent and child. It therefore can-
not stand. 
405 U.S. at 656-57, 31 L.Ed.2d at 562. The Court concluded 
that all parents are "constitutionally entitled to a hearing 
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on their fitness before their children are removed from 
their custody." 405 U.S. at 658, 31 L.Ed.2d at 563. 
In Stanley, the statute presumed that unwed 
fathers were unfit to care for their children. In this 
case, the statute presumes that all unwed fathers who do not 
file a notice of paternity within the extremely narrow time 
limits imposed by the statute have abandoned their children. 
Just as the presumption in Stanley that all unwed fathers 
were unfit was not true in the case of Mr. Stanley, the 
presumption created by this statute that all unwed fathers 
not filing a notice of paternity within the strict time 
periods imposed have abandoned their children is not true in 
the case of Mr. Ellis. Accordingly, this statute is, like 
the statute stricken by the United States Supreme Court in 
Stanley, constitutionally invalid as applied to ~_r. Ellis. 
Likewise, in In re Adoption of Lathrop, supra, the 
court, after considering the pronouncements of the United 
States Supreme Court in Stanley and Quilloin, held: 
[DJue process requires that a putative 
father who appears and asserts his 
desire to care for his child has rights 
paramount to those of non-parents, 
unless he is found to be an unfit 
father in a fitness hearing .... 
In view of the fact that the father 
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of an illegitimate child does have 
parental rights, we hold today ... 
that due process and equal protection 
re.quire that he be given notice of 
the pending adoption of his child. 
Actual notice should of course be 
given whenever possible; and when 
the father's identity and whereabouts 
are unknown and unascertainable by 
due diligence, constructive notice 
must be given in a form reasonably 
calculated to actually inform him of 
the adoption, while at the same time 
duly protecting the privacy rights 
of the mother. 
[O]ur holding today is not a bar to 
further legislative treatment of the 
problem so long as it recognizes the 
father's right to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and makes distinc-
tions rationally related to the objec-
tives to be achieved. 
575 P.2d at 898-99 (emphasis added). Thus, the court held 
that in order to provide the minimum due process protection 
required in light of Stanley, an unwed father must be given 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to present his case; any 
statutory scheme which, like a bolt of lightning, oblit-
erates constitutional rights cannot be tolerated. 
The interest of an unwed father in his child was 
also recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re 
Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1965). In that case, which 
predated even Stanley, the court held that an unwed father 
must be afforded an opportunity to express his interest in 
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his child when its natural mother has relinquished the child 
for adoption. In so holding, the court noted with language 
equally applicable to this case that on a nation-wide basis 
the more recent decisions demonstrated 
a natural and understandable willingness 
to listen to a natural parent who asserts 
a sincere interest in and concern for his 
child. Certainly, in the case before us, 
where a mother seeks to relinquish the 
child and refuses marriage to legitimate 
it, a court cannot well look with indiffer-
ence on the interest of the father who 
wishes to raise and provide for it. Even 
though the out-of-wedlock father does not 
appear before the court in the most favorable 
light, he should nevertheless be given an 
opportunity to express his interest when 
the mother has relinquished the child. 
A sincere concern which springs from a 
sense of responsibility to his own flesh 
and blood is reason enough to permit him 
to be heard. Although this policy may 
present some risk for the adoption 
process, it should nevertheless be 
permitted where the claim is asserted 
promptly and under circumstances so as to 
minimize the risk of trauma to the child 
or the adoptive parents which would 
accompany judicial acceptance of his 
assertion. 
134 N.W.2d at 131-32. In this case, Mr. Ellis has acted 
with extreme swiftness to acknowledge the child and assert 
his rights. Within hours after the birth of the child, he 
had contacted LDS Social Services and advised them of his 
claim. Within days, he filed not only his notice of pater-
nity but also the present action to enforce his rights. The 
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child is yet so young that it will suffer no trauma, and Mr. 
Ellis has done all that he reasonably can to place the 
adopt~ve parents on notice of his claims. Any unhappiness 
which will be visited upon the prospective adoptive parents 
through the exercise of Mr. Ellis's rights will be a result 
not of his conduct but of the conduct of LDS Social Services 
and the procedure necessitated by the laws of this state. 
Similarly, in Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th 
Cir. 1974), the Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an Oregon 
statute which, under certain circumstances, provided that in 
connection with the adoption of his child, an unwed father 
was to be "disregarded just as if he were dead." In reli-
ance upon Stanley, the court held: 
The application of the statute in 
question would infringe upon the 
Federal constitutional rights of 
the appellant and natural fathers 
similarly situated. We declare 
that said statute is constitution-
ally null and void and, hence, 
unenforceable. 
504 F.2d at 1068. 
As applied to Mr. Ellis in this case, Section 78-
30-4 (3) is particularly pernicious. Mr. Ellis and Miss 
Bruner are residents of California. Their child was con-
ceived in California. Miss Bruner remained in California up 
until the time of her delivery, leaving for Utah only 
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immediately prior to the birth of the child. Under such 
circumstances, it is unrealistic to suppose that Mr. Ellis 
could have filed his notice of paternity prior to the birth 
of his son since he would have had no knowledge that Miss 
Bruner would come to Utah or even that she would elect to 
leave California. Accordingly, the time period prescribed 
by Section 78-30-4(3) (b) would require that Mr. Ellis quite 
literally "shadow" the child's mother; follow on her heels 
to the state in which she selects to be delivered of the 
child; and immediately learn of and comply with Utah's 
stringent statutory requirements. In this case, Mr. Ellis 
would have had to follow Miss Bruner to Utah, locate her 
whereabouts in Utah County, and file his notice within four 
days. Examination of the practical effect of this statute 
in light of these facts makes abundantly clear that, as a 
practical matter, the statut~ affords unwed fathers abso-
lutely no protection. 
The due process standards established by this 
Court's decisions and the decision of the United States 
Supreme court in Stanley, require that the unwed father be 
given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
Section 78-30-4(3), as applied to the facts of this case, 
gives Mr. Ellis neither notice nor a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard; rather, it imposes time requirements so strict 
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that, as applied to these facts, the protection purportedly 
offered by the statute is but a shadowy illusion. 
C. Section 78-30-4 Unconstitutionally Den~es 
Mr. Ellis Equal Protection. 
The United States Supreme Court has held not only 
that an unwed father has a constitutionally protected 
interest in his child which must be accorded the protections 
of procedural due process (see, Point I(B), supra), but also 
that statutes enacted by the states to afford this due 
process protection must comply with so-called "equal protection" 
concepts. In Caban v. Mohammed, u .s. , 60 L.Ed.2d 
297, 99 S. Ct. (1979), the United States Supreme Court 
very recently held that a New York statutory adoption scheme 
closely similar to that of Utah was constitutionally void 
because, as applied to unwed fathers, it denied equal 
protection. The statute before the Court required actual 
consent to adoption to be given by both parents of children 
"born in wedlock" but only consent "[o]f the mother ... of 
a child born out of wedlock." U.S. at , 60 L.Ed.2d 
at 303. The statute also provided that actual consent was 
unnecessary in cases where a court determined that the 
parent whose consent would otherwise be necessary had 
abandoned the child. Thus, the statutory scheme was essen-
tially identical with Utah's. 
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In Caban, the unwed father, who sought to adopt 
and have custody of his two children, appealed from decisions 
of the New York state courts that allowed his children to be 
adopted by their natural mother and her present husband 
without his consent and against his wishes. As construed by 
the United States Supreme Court, the New York statute 
operated in the exact manner that the Utah statute does in 
this case: 
[A]n unwed mother has the authority 
under New York law to block the 
adoption of her child simply by 
withholding consent. The unwed 
father has no similar control over 
the fate of his child, even when 
his parental relationship is 
substantial--as in this case. He 
may prevent the termination of his 
parental rights only by showing 
that the best interests of the 
child would not permit the child's 
adoption by the petitioning couple. 
U.S. at , 60 L.Ed.2d at 303-04. In defense of the 
statute, New York contended that an unwed father was accorded 
full due process since he was given notice of the petition 
for adoption and a full opportunity to be heard and to 
establish that the interests of the child would be best 
served by a denial of the petition. Additionally, it was 
argued that various state interests, including the encourageme~t 
of the swift adoption or legitimation of illegitimate children, 
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were served by the challenged statute. Nevertheless, the 
Court held: 
In sum, we believe that [the 
New York statute] is another example 
of "overbroad generalizations" in 
gender-based classifications .. e • 
The effect of New York's classification 
is to discriminate against unwed 
fathers even when their identity is 
known and they have manifested a 
significant paternal interest in the 
child. The facts of this case illus-
trate the harshness of classifying 
unwed fathers as being invariably less 
qualified and entitled than mothers to 
exercise a concerned judgment as to the 
fate of their children. [The statute] 
both excludes some loving fathers from 
full participation in the decision 
whether their children will be adopted 
and, at the same time, enable some 
alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut 
off the paternal rights of fathers. 
We conclude that this undifferentiated 
distinction between unwed mothers and 
unwed fathers, applicable in all 
circumstances where adoption of a 
child of theirs is at issue, does not 
bear a substantial relationship to the 
State's asserted interests. 
U.S. at , 60 L.Ed.2d at 308 (footnote and citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has 
unequivocally held that a statute which denies to an unwed 
father the rights and privileges accorded to unwed mothers 
is constitutionally invalid. 
In Utah, Section 78-30-4(1) establishes the 
circumstances under which parental consent is necessary as a 
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condition precedent to the adoption of a child: 
A child cannot be adopted 
without the consent of each living 
parent having rights in relation 
to said child, except that consent 
is not necessary from a father or 
mother who has been judicially 
deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, 
neglect or desertion . 
§78-30-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Add-
itionally, Section 78-30-5 provides that consent is not 
necessary where a parent has been determined by the District 
Court to have failed to provide support and otherwise 
maintain a parental relationship. This statute also creates 
a rebuttable presumption that the child has been abandoned 
if there is no contact within a one-year period. 
No child, therefore, can be adopted unless its 
mother and, if it is legitimate, its father, either consent 
to the adoption or have been judicially deprived of all 
parental rights. A child may, however, be adopted absent 
the consent of its unwed father under subsection (c) of 
Section 78-30-4(3), which provides: 
Any father of [an illegitimate] 
child who fails to file and register 
his notice of claim to paternity and 
his agreement to support the child 
shall be barred from thereafter 
bringing or maintaining any action 
to establish his paternity of the 
child. Such fa£lure shall further 
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constitute an abandonment of said 
child and a wa~ver and surrender of 
any right to notice of or to a hear-
ing in a judicial proceeding for the 
adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the 
adoption of such child shall not be 
required. 
§78-30-4(3) (c), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Thus, only in the case of an unwed father may a child be 
adopted without either consent or judicial deprivation; 
moreover, the child may be adopted even over the objection 
of its unwed father. Accordingly, while the consent of an 
unwed mother is required (unless she has been judicially 
deprived through an appropriate hearing) , the consent of an 
unwed father is unnecessary unless the father has complied 
with the onerous burden of filing his notice within the 
narrow time period prescribed by Section 78-30-4(3) (b). 
Unless an unwed father immediately files his 
notice, he is irrebuttably presumed to have abandoned his 
child. In the case of an unwed mother, however, abandonment 
of the child must be proven to the satisfaction of the court 
and 
the court does not easily find such 
abandonment, but will do so only 
when the evidence is clear and con-
vincing that the parent has either 
expressed an intention, or so 
conducted himself as to clearly 
indicate an intention, to relinquish 
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parental rights and reject parental 
responsibilities to his child. 
Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977). 
Under the clear holding of the United States Supreme Court 
in Caban, such disparity of treatment is unconstitutional. 
Likewise, if an unwed mother consents to the 
adoption of her child and then has a change of heart, this 
Court has held that the validity of her consent must be 
"carefully scrutinize[d] ... lest an honest, worthy and 
well meaning natural parent be unjustly deprived of her 
child." In re Adoption of D, 122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223, 
226 (1953). In the case of an unwed father, however, 
Section 78-30-4(3) (c) provides that "the consent of [an 
unwed] father to the adoption of [an illegitimate] child 
shall not be required." Again, this disparity of treatment 
is constitutionally impermissible and renders the statute 
unenforceable. 
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court held 
that an unwed father has a constitutionally protected 
interest in his child and that this interest must be afforded 
at least minimal due pro6ess protection. In this case, 
Section 78-30-4 has purported irrevocably to deprive Mr. 
Ellis of all interest in his child. Yet, as applied to 
Mr. Ellis, that statute affords him no notice and no oppor-
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tunity to be meaningfully heard; it, therefore, denies him 
the due process protecton required by Stanley. Since Mr. 
Ellis and Miss Bruner were residents of California, where 
the child was conceived and where Miss Bruner continued to 
reside until immediately prior to the birth of the child, 
Mr. Ellis had no opportunity to file the notice purportediy 
required by Section 78-30-4 prior to the birth of the child. 
Yet, defendants-respondents claim that within four days 
following the birth of the child, Mr. Ellis had been forever 
deprived of the opportunity to file such notice, since Miss 
Bruner had released the child to LDS Social Services. To 
require a resident of California to locate his child's 
mother in Utah, come to Utah, and file his notice of pater-
nity all within four days of the birth of the child is so 
unreasonable as to deny any semblance of due process pro-
tection. 
In Caban, the United States Supreme Court held 
that a state statute which afforded the interests of unwed 
mothers in their children a greater degree of protection 
than it afforded the corresponding interests of unwed fathers 
was unconstitutional. In this case, Section 78-30-4 oper-
ates irrevocably to terminate all rights of an unwed father 
in his child; to presume his abandonment of the child; and 
to render unnecessary his consent to the adoption of the 
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child. On the other hand, unless she has abandoned her 
child and been judicially deprived of her parental rights, 
an unwed mother must freely and voluntarily consent to the 
adoption of her child. This Court has held "clear and 
convincing" evidence to be required to sustain a finding of 
abandonment and has required that any consent given by the 
mother be "carefully scrutinized" in order to assure that it 
was freely and knowingly given. None of these meaningful 
and necessary protections are afforded to unwed fathers. 
Accordingly, the gender-based disparity of protections 
afforded unwed fathers, such as Mr. Ellis, have denied him 
equal protection of the law in violation both of the Utah 
Constitution and of the United States Constitution. As 
applied in this case, Section 78-30-4(3) is void. 
II. THE NOTICE OF PATERNITY WAS TIMELY FILED IN 
THIS CASE. 
Assuming, arguendo, the constitutionality of 
Section 78-30-4, the notice of paternity filed by Mr. Ellis 
was timely. The strict time period within which an unwed 
father must file his notice of paternity is established by 
Section 78-30-4(3) (b), which provides: 
The notice may be registered 
prior to the birth of the child 
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but must be registered prior to 
the date the illegitimate child 
is relinquished or placed with an 
agency licensed to provide adoption 
services or prior to the filing of 
a petitionby a person with whom 
the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. 
§78-30-4(3) (b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, the notice may be filed prior to the 
birth of the child. However, in this case, this was imprac-
tical since Mr. Ellis and Miss Bruner were both residents of 
California and Mr. Ellis had no way of knowing that Miss 
Bruner would elect to travel to Utah to be delivered of 
their child. 
The section also mandates that the notice must be 
filed prior to the occurrence of two stated events. These 
events are separated by the word "or", indicating that the 
notice must be filed before at least one of the events, but 
not necessiarily before both. Therefore, the unwed father 
must file his notice either before "the illegitimate child 
is relinquished or placed with an agenecy licensed to 
provide adoption services" ~ before the "filing of a 
petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the 
child for adoption." It is important to note that the 
section does not state that the unwed father's notice must 
be filed before whichever is applicable of the specified 
events. 
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In this case, Mr. Ellis had filed his notice 
before any petition was filed for the adoption of his son. 
In fact, the Record presently before this Court demonstrates 
that no such petition has been filed and none will be during 
the pendency of this appeal. (Stipulation dated February 11, 
1980.) Since Mr. Ellis filed his notice prior to the filing 
of a petition for the adoption of his son, his notice was 
timely. 
To construe Section 78-30-4(3) (b)--as the District 
Court apparently did--to mean that if the child is placed 
with a licensed agency, the unwed father's notice must be 
filed, if at all, prior to the release of the child by its 
mother, is to arrive at a total absurdity, since subsection 
(d) provides: 
In any adoption proceeding 
pertaining to an illegitimate child, 
if there is no showing that the 
father has consented to the proposed 
adoption, it shall be necessary to 
file with the court prior to the 
granting of a decree allowing the 
adoption a certificate from the 
bureau of vital statistics, signed 
by its director, which certificate 
shall state that a diligent search 
has been made of the registry of 
notices from fathers of illegitimate 
children and that no registration 
has been found pertaining to the 
father of the illegitimate child 
in question. 
§78-J0-4(3) (d), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
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(emphasis added). In this case, if it is held that Mr. Ellis's 
notice was not timely even though it was filed before any 
petition for adoption was filed, then an insurmountable 
problem is created: While Mr. Ellis is precluded from 
asserting any right to the child by subsection (c) , ho one 
else may adopt the child because it is not possible to 
comply with subsection (d) . The required certificate of the 
director of the Bureau of Vital Statistics cannot be filed 
because a diligent search of the Bureau's records will 
reveal Mr. Ellis's notice. But, absent the filing of a 
certificate stating that no such notice was filed, the child 
cannot be adopted. 
The only way to resolve this apparent conflict in 
the statute is to construe subsection (b) in such a manner 
that the unwed father's notice of paternity is deemed timely 
if it is filed either before the child is relinquished to 
the licensed agency or before a petition for the adoption of 
the child has been filed. Such a construction is appropriate 
not only because it avoids creating an absurdity in the 
statute, but also because it narrowly and strictly construes 
a statute that is in derogation of the unwed father's 
rights in his child. 
A similar problem was faced by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court in In re Adoption of Narragon, 530 P.2d 413 (Wyo. 1975). 
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In that case, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to grant an 
adoption without the consent of the child's natural father 
although the petitioners argued that the father's consent 
was unnecessary under a Wyoming statute that permitted 
adoption without the consent of any parent who had "caused 
the child to be maintained in a public or private children's 
institution or the Wyoming Department of Public Welfare for 
a period of one year .... " The petitioners argued that 
the statute should be construed as if the word "by" had been 
inserted by the Legislature so that the statute would provide 
that it was applicable to children "maintained in a public 
or private children's institution or by the Wyoming Depart-
ment of Public Welfare." The petitioners pointed out that 
the Wyoming Department of Public Welfare did not have any 
actual facilities to care for children but rather merely 
provided funds for their support~ therefore, it was apparent 
that the phrase "maintained 
. by the Wyoming Department 
of Public Welfar~" was what the Legislature had intended. 
Nevertheless, since the statute was in derogation of parental 
rights, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to construe it so 
as to destroy or infringe the rights of a child's natural 
father, holding: 
There is a well-recognized and 
almost universal rule that when a 
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proceeding is against a nonconsenting 
parent in an adoption proceeding the 
statute must be strictly construed 
and every reasonable intendment is 
made in favor of the nonconsenting 
parent's claims .... 
It would seem particularly important, 
since this involves the matter of 
minor children, that the intention 
of the legislature be clearly 
expressed and the statute clarified. 
530 P.2d at 414 (numerous citations omitted). Likewise in 
this case, since the only construction of the statute which 
does not result in a total absurdity renders timely the 
notice filed by Mr. Ellis, that construction should be 
applied, thereby preserving Mr. Ellis's legitimate and 
substantial interests in his child. 
There is no justification to construe the statute, 
as did the lower court, in such a manner as to both deprive 
Mr. Ellis of all rights in his child and to thereby create 
an absurdity under which not only can Mr. Ellis not obtain 
any rights in the child, but the child can never be adopted 
by anyone. Such a result is to sentence a child, whose 
father earnestly desires to provide for him, to a life 
without any legally recognized parents. 
III. BY PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGING THE CHILD AS HIS, 
MR. ELLIS HAS LEGITIMATED AND ADOPTED HIS SON. 
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Immediately following the birth of his son, 
Mr. Ellis advised LDS Social Services that he was the father 
of the child and that he desired to care for him. A notice 
of his paternity of the child has been filed with the Bureau 
of Vital Statistics. More.over, Mr. Ellis has publicly 
acknowledged that he is the father of this child by filing 
his verified Complaint in this action. Under the provisions 
of Section 78-30-12, Mr. Ellis has legimated and adopted his 
son: 
The father of an illegitimate 
child, by publicly acknowledging 
it as his own, receiving it as such 
with the consent of his wife, if he 
is married, into his family, and 
otherwise treating it as if it were 
a legitimate child, thereby adopts 
it as such, and such child is there-
upon deemed for all purposes legitimate 
from the time of its birth. The 
foregoing provisions of this chapter 
do not apply to such an adoption. 
§78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Accordingly, by advising LDS Social Services that 
he was father of the child; by filing his notice of pater-
nity with the Bureati of Vital Statistics; and by filing his 
verified Complaint in which he stated his desire to bring 
the child into his home and, there, in conjunction with his 
parents, to care for it, Mr. Ellis has legitimated and 
adopted the child. By the express provisions of the statute, 
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the child is "deemed for all purposes legitimate from the 
time of its birth." Additionally, the strict and constit-
utionally infirm provisions of Section 78-30-4 are expressly 
made inapplicable where the child has been legitimated by 
its father in accordance with this section. 
Since Mr. Ellis is, by virtue of Section 78-30-12, 
considered the father of his son, and the child's mother has 
released and abandoned it, Mr. Ellis is entitled to the 
custody of his son. This Court faced a similar situation in 
In re Baby Girl M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970). ,In 
that case, however, the father did not publicly acknowledge 
his paternity of the child until a deprivation hearing was 
commenced in Juvenile Court. In the course of his opinion 
for this Court, Justice Callister noted: 
This is the first time that this 
court has been confronted with the 
issue of whether the father of an 
illegitimate child, who has publicly 
acknowledged it, has a legal right to 
the care, custody, and control of his 
child, assuming that he is a fit and 
proper person. Undoubtedly, the dearth 
of cases involving this issue is 
probably attributable to the provisions 
of Section 78-30-12, U.C.A. 1953. The 
factual background in the instant case 
indicates that but for the acts of an 
alert social worker, who removed Baby 
M at three days of age from the nursery 
of the hospital where the mother was 
confined for the birth, Baby M would 
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have been legitimated according to the 
statutory provisions. 
476 P.2d at 1015 (footnotes omitted). It was then held that: 
A statutory parent-child relationship 
has been established between the 
publicly acknowledged child and 
his putative father that places the 
child in parity with a legitimate 
child in the rights of support, 
education, and inheritance. 
The putative father of an illegitimate 
child is entitled to its custody and 
control as against all but the mother, 
if he is competent to care for and 
suitable to take charge of the child 
and if it appears that the best inter-
ests of the child will be thereby 
secured. 
476 P.2d at 1017 (emphasis added). The case was remanded to 
the Juvenile Court for a determination of whether the unwed 
father was a fit person to have the custody of his child. 
Likewise in this case, having legitimated and 
adopted his son by his concerted efforts to publicly acknow-
ledge the child, Mr. Ellis is entitled to the custody of his 
son unless it appears from a full hearing in the District 
Court that he is unfit to have custody. 
CONCLUSION 
Both this Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have recognized that an unwed father's substantial 
interest in his child is entitled to constitutional protection. 
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No individual may be deprived of a constitutionally protected 
interest except by such means as assure due process of law. 
This Court has frequently held that, as a minimum, due 
process requires reasonable notice and an opportunity for a 
meaningful hearing. In this case, Section 78-30-4(3) purports 
forever to bar Mr. Ellis from asserting his interest in his 
son solely because, as an unwed father, he did not file a 
notice of paternity within the narrow time period prescribed. 
In order to have complied with this requirement, Mr. Ellis, 
who is a resident of California, would have had to have 
located the child's mother here in Utah and filed his notice 
within four days of the birth of the child. Accordingly, 
the provisions of Section 78-30-4(3) operate not only to 
deny Mr. Ellis any hearing but also fail to provide reason-
able notice that he needs to take some action to protect his 
interests. In other words, as applied to Mr. Ellis, the 
section creates an irrebuttable presumption that (within 
four days after the birth of his son) Mr. Ellis has abandoned 
the child. Such cavalier presumptions and so severely-
limited an opportunity to protect his interests deny Mr. Ellis 
any semblance of due process and are, therefore, constit-
utionally invalid as applied to him. 
Additionally, Section 78-30-4(3) operates to 
create a statutory adoption system under which the interests 
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of unwed fathers in their children are accorded inunensely 
less protection and consideration than are the corresponding 
interests of unwed mothers. For an adoption to take place 
under Utah law, an unwed mother must either freely and 
voluntarily consent or have abandoned the child and been 
judicially deprived of all parental rights. An unwed· 
father, on the other hand, loses forever any opportunity to 
enjoy his interests in his child merely by failing to file 
the required notice within an extremely short time period. 
The decisions of this Court hold, moreover, that the consent 
of an unwed mother is to be "carefully scrutinized" to 
assure its validity and that in a proceeding to judicially 
deprive an unwed mother of her parental rights, her abandon-
ment of the child must be proved by "clear and convincing" 
evidence. There is, therefore, an overwhelming disparity of 
treatment between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in relation 
to the assertion of their interests in their children. The 
United States Supreme Court has held unequivocally that such 
gender-based disparity of treatment is constitutionally 
impermissible. As applied to Mr. Ellis in this case, 
Section 78-30-4(3) is. void. 
Even assuming the constitutional. validity of 
Section 78-30-4(3), the District Court's decision dismissing 
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the action by which Mr. Ellis sought to assert his interests 
in his child is erroneous. Under the only construction of 
Section 78-30-4(3) (b) that does not result in a total 
absurdity, Mr. Ellis's notice was timely because it was 
filed before any petition for the adoption of his son had 
been commenced. To accept the District Court's construction 
of this section is to deprive Mr. Ellis of any interest in 
his child while at the same time creating a statutory 
boonedoggle in which no other person may adopt the child. 
Such a result is as unfair as it is illogical. 
Finally, the ruling of the District Court cannot 
be supported because it fails to recognize that by publicly 
acknowledging his son, Mr. Ellis is deemed to have adopted 
the child. Under the express statutory provisions of 
Section 78-30-12, the notice provisions of Section 78-30-
4 (3), which are essential to the District Court's dismissal, 
are inapplicable to this case. Since Mr. Ellis is deemed to 
have adopted his son and the child's mother has clearly 
manifest her desire to relinquish and abandon the infant, 
Mr. Ellis is entitled to be awarded custody of his son 
subject only to a parental fitness determination. 
Although plaintiff-appellant submits that Section 
78-30-4 is clearly unconstitutional as applied to him, even 
assuming the constitutional validity of the statutory 
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provision, the District Court's dismissal of his action was 
erroneous and must be reversed. ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _i!_ .,day of March, 
1980. 
DART & STEGALL 
By 
By 
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